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ARTICLES
Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1998 Term
BY RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,**
R. CHAD HALES,*** RACHELLE FLEMING,****
MATHEW FLEMING*****
I. Introduction
This Study, the fourteenth in a series,1 tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1998
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The
author has written numerous articles on constitutional issues and conducts an annual
survey of Supreme Court voting trends published by the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly. He is former Assistant to the Solicitor General, United States Department of
Justice, where he briefed and argued eight cases before the United States Supreme Court.
The author is currently Director of NGO Family Voice: The World Family Policy Center,
an inter-disciplinary family policy association, headquartered at Brigham Young
University. He is married to Melany Moore Wilkins and is the father of four children.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999. Associate,
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier.
* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2000.
* J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2001.
* J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2001.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last four studies, analyzing the 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996
terms, were published in the HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY. See
Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997
Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study].
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Term.2 The analysis is designed to determine whether individual
Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same as compared with past Terms. As
in politics, whether or not a judicial trend is "conservative" or
"liberal" often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the
American Civil Liberties Union could easily paint an ideological
picture of the Court far different from one sketched by a lawyer for
Americans United For Life.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty By tracking the Term-to-Term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these categories of cases,'
and by applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,' this
study attempts to provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and predictions regarding its past and future trends.
Whether any statistical study of a process as complex as judicial
decision-making can be reliable is, of course, open to debate.6 But,
within the limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch"
ideology, this annual survey offers students and practitioners
information useful for assessing how the Court or an individual
Justice will vote in particular types of cases.
This Term's survey shows mixed results, but suggests an overall
strengthening of liberal voting behavior in most categories. Majority
decisions in six of the ten categories (Civil-State Party, Criminal-State
Party, Criminal-Federal Party, First Amendment, Statutory Civil
2. The 1998 Term covers decisions made from October 1998 to July 1999.
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICrIONARY OF MODERN POLITicAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987)
(discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions,
however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that
conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect for established
institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies, and a general mistrust of theory
as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth-
century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certaino
of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain[] of a desire to restrict
government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. See infra note 38.
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Rights, and Swing Vote) indicated slight to significant liberal
movement. The Statutory Civil Rights category, perhaps the Court's
most consistent liberal-movement indicator, showed strengthening in
the Court's support of Civil Rights claims. Also, liberal movement in
the Study's most reliable category for ideological manifestations of
voting behavior' - Criminal-State Party - showed slight liberal
movement in the majority's overall decisions, and significant liberal
movement in unanimous cases (with every unanimous case being
decided in favor of the criminal defendant).' Yet, perhaps most
indicative is the Swing Vote category which indicates that, in
ideologically charged cases, the supposed "conservative" Court voted
liberally 57.1% of the time, maintaining last Term's liberal
inclination.' This is the second consecutive year, and the third time in
the past five Terms, that the Court has "swung" liberally in close
cases, suggesting a liberal shift in the Court's ideological posture.
Of the four categories that showed conservative movement, none
are particularly noteworthy. The result in the Equal Protection
category, which showed significant conservative movement, is
undermined by the fact that the Court only heard one equal
protection case this Term. Furthermore, while the Civil-Federal
category showed significant conservative movement, (from 36.4% last
Term to 61.1% this Term in favor of the federal government), this
category ranks next to last in terms of its reliability as an indicator of
liberal and conservative ideology." Therefore, this conservative
result, although significant, may not be as indicative of a Court-wide
trend as the trends identified in other categories. Similarly, the
Federalism category, which is the fourth least reliable category for
indicating conservative-liberal trends, 2  showed only slight
conservative movement (an increase of 4.4 percentage points)."
Finally, the slight conservative movement in the Jurisdiction Category
(a decrease of 3.6 percentage points for decisions favoring the
exercise of jurisdiction) is too small to indicate any significant
conservative trend in the Court.4
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Data Table 3.
9. See infra Data Table 10.
10. See infra Data Table 6.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See id.
13. See infra Data Table 9.
14. See infra Data Table 6.
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Last Term's predictive statistics met with mixed success in
forecasting this Term's actual voting patterns. The Study most
accurately predicted results for cases involving questions of federal
jurisdiction, with an average error of only about 2.97 percentage
points per Justice.15 The least accurate predictions were in the
Federalism category, with an average of 18.0 percentage points error
per Justice.6 With respect to individual Justices, this Term's
predicted scores were most accurate for Justice Kennedy, with an
average' error of about 7.24 percentage points." This is a substantial
improvement over last Term's frontrunner for predictability (Justice
Scalia), whose average error was near 20 percentage points."
Following closely behind Justice Kennedy were Justice Thomas, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist who deviated an average of only 8.91 and
13.3 percentage points respectively from their predicted scores. The
least accurate predictions were for Justice Ginsburg, with an average
error of 32.01 percentage points, and Justice Souter, deviating on
average 26.34 percentage points. However, the small sample sizes in
the First Amendment and Equal Protection categories accounted for
a significant portion of the prediction error for almost all the
Justices.'O The "Category" analysis, introduced in the 1996 Study and
15. See infra Data Table 8. The Jurisdiction category was also the category that most
closely matched our predictions last Term, with an average deviation of around seven
percentage points per Justice. See 1997 Study, supra note 1.
16. This excludes both the First Amendment and Equal Protection categories, which,
because of the lack of cases dealing with their respective issues, have an
uncharacteristically high degree of volatility among the Justices' individual voting
patterns, which in turn results in uncharacteristically inaccurate predictions.
17. The average is reached by adding the error between the prediction and this
Term's actual result in every category and dividing this sum by the number of categories
used. Predictions marked with a "0" could not be calculated using our prediction formula
and so were not included in determining the average. For example, Kennedy's predicted
score for the 1998 Term in the First Amendment category was "0." Thus, the sum of
Kennedy's total deviation in all categories was divided by nine instead of ten. For
purposes of this tabulation, only absolute value is used. Thus, a "-52.4" is treated as "52.4"
for purposes of computing a Justice's total deviation.
18. Last Term, Justice Kennedy was the least predictable Justice varying an average
of over 28 percentage points from the 1996 Term's predictions. See 1997 Study, supra note
1.
19. See 1997 Study, supra note 1.
20. For example, in the First Amendment category, Justice Scalia erred 100.0
percentage points from last Term's prediction, which accounted for nearly half of his total
deviation sum of 221.7 percentage points. Justice Scalia incurred another 65.2 deviation
percentage points in the Equal Protection category. Thus, two categories containing a
total of three cases accounted for nearly 75% of Justice Scalia's deviation from last Term's
predictions. Surely, had these categories been represented with more cases, Justice
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
included in the Study again this Term, indicates that six categories -
state criminal cases,2' statutory civil rights, state civil cases, 3 federal
jurisdiction,2 4 federal criminal cases, and federalism 6 - are the best
indicators of liberal/conservative predilections among the Justices,
while the remaining categories - First Amendment, 7 federal civil
cases, 2 and Equal Protection - are relatively poor indicators of the
Justices' propensities.
Frontier analysis this Term revealed a generally familiar pattern,
with the Chief Justice reclaiming his accustomed position as the most
conservative member of the court after having been temporarily
displaced by Justice Thomas last Term.31 Likewise, Justice Stevens
regained his position as the most liberal member of the Court from
Justice Souter, who held the top spot last Term.32 Perhaps the most
surprising result revealed this Term by our frontier analysis was
Justice Scalia's fifth place showing behind Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy on the conservative frontier.
This Study is divided into sections to make it more accessible to
the reader. The precise details of the statistical analysis - as can be
gleaned from a glance at the equations (and explanations) in
Appendix B - are hardly the stuff of light cocktail conversations. But
one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to understand
the general trends that flow from the Study's analysis. Part II gives a
description of the mode of analysis employed by the Study. Part III
follows with a general overview of this Term's findings. Part IV sets
out the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and
discusses - table-by-table and chart-by-chart - the information
contained in them. Parts V and VI describe the methodology (and
outcome) of this year's "Category" and "Frontier" Analyses
Scalia's and other Justices' deviation totals and averages would have been significantly
different.
21. See infra Data Table 3.
22. See infra Data Table 7.
23. See infra Data Table 1.
24. See infra Data Table 8.
25. See infra Data Table 4.
26. See infra Data Table 9.
27. See infra Data Table 5.
28. See infra Data Table 2.
29. See infra Data Table 6.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1 and Frontier Chart 1.
32- See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2 and Frontier Chart 2.
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respectively. Appendices A and B detail the definitions and
statistical tests employed by this Study.
H. Mode of Analysis
The Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment,
Equal Protection, etc.) or on the character of the parties involved
(e.g., state or federal government litigants).33 The tenth category
tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in
cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions - protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The
tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights' or exercise judicial restraint.35
33. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state, or one of its
officials or political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government, or one of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7) statutory civil
rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and
related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
34. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2
also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting
private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to
individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state
authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny
federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
35. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other Tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indication of "judicial
activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to
overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also
relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the
states within the federal system.
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative"
or "liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of governmental power as conservative, and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual rights as liberal. Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as
opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The Study
classifies all contrary votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions (a
significant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are included in
the Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative ideology
may not have influenced the outcome of such cases. Unanimous
opinions often result when either the law or the facts, or both, point
so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a decisional factor.
Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not always, or even
necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.
Despite these difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study - that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court to individual rights and judicial
restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology - appears
sound. 6 For example, deference to legislatures frequently results in
rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated upon the
impropriety of governmental action.' Judicial restraint is associated
with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution or a
statute.3 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to
state courts with their possible bias in favor of state governmental
action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal protection
of rights.3 ' Therefore, to the extent the Study's basic ideological
assumptions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes are
36. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also category analysis discussion infra
Part V.
37. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440-44 (1998) (holding that Congress's
proof of paternity requirement for citizenship by birth whenever the citizen parent of a
child born out of wedlock abroad is the child's father, as opposed to the mother, does not
represent unconstitutional denial of equal protection based on the sex of the citizen
parent).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 478 (1998) (holding that
claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no
ground for removal of state law claims based on federal question jurisdiction).
Spring 2000]
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accurate, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the voting
patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.
To reckon current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other
Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1989 through
1997 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes for the
Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the Court's voting trends revealed in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 1998 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern
and whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-
Term voting patterns of the Justices.'
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justice's conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis4' mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually presented in a given Term
rather than against any absolute scale.
All of these data and statistics must be interpreted with caution.
The percentages and statistical results revealed on each table are
affected not only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also
by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme
Court cases are not the result of random selection, and the universe
of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since both random
sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of any fully
reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study are not
beyond dispute. There are obvious limitations to any empirical
analysis of a subjective decision making process.42
40. See infra Appendix B.
41. See id.
42. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ALLEN T. CRAIG & ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUcTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (1995); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is
far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Reliable
statistics generally require large quantities of information to produce reliable results. As
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth either conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years,
experienced Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine
the ideological predilections of individual Justices in framing their
arguments to the Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians
are fond of attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel.
Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars, and the public have long
assumed that assessments of Court ideology are valuable - even
though such assessments may be based upon little more than the gut
reactions of the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved.
This Study, based upon a systematic methodology for objectively
gathering, quantifying, and analyzing data over time, should be more
reliable than such ad hoc assessments.
m. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 1998 Term
This Term suggests a slight strengthening of last Term's liberal
results with minor conservative movement in only four of the ten
categories. Contrasting with any conservative indicators is the
Court's repeated favoritism for liberal outcomes in ideologically
contended cases decided by one vote. Furthermore, liberal support
favoring statutory civil rights claims continued to rise, and the Study's
most reliable category for indicating liberal-conservative trends -
Criminal-State Party - shows liberal movement for the first time since
the 1996 Term. An overview of the results in each individual
category follows. A more in-depth analysis for each category is set
forth in Part IV. B. of this Study.
Data Table 1, Civil Party versus State Government - Although
the Court almost doubled the number of civil cases it decided
involving state parties this Term, its treatment of such cases remained
constant, finding for the government 44.8% of the time. Additionally,
there was no significant change in the conservative to liberal ordering
of the Justices. However, the number of split decisions decided in
favor of state parties in this category increased, suggesting a slight
conservative shift in favor of State parties.
Data Table 2, Civil Party versus Federal Government - During
the 1998 Term, the Court was much more conservative in its
treatment of the federal government in civil cases, finding for the
sample sizes become larger, inferences become more accurate. This Study is subject to
sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and because it is comparatively
small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's
(or the Court's) views.
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federal government more often than last Term in "Majority," "Split,"
and "Unanimous" decisions. Likewise, each Justice increased
support of the federal government in civil cases over last Term, and
four of the Justices exhibited a statistically significant change in
voting behavior. Interestingly, historically liberal Justices Ginsburg
and Stevens were the most supportive of the federal government in
this category, and historically conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist
was the least supportive of the federal government.
Data Table 3, Criminal Party versus State Government - Data
Table 3 demonstrates decreased favor for the states in criminal cases
during the 1998 Term.43 Although the Court continued to vote for the
state in a majority of cases, the 1998 Term voting record indicates a
slight liberal trend. This trend is evidenced not only in the
"Unanimous" and "Majority" votes, but also by a decrease in the
individual score of each Justice. The order of the Justices remained
the same, however, with Justice Thomas favoring the government in
80% of the decisions and Justice Stevens voting for the government
only 9.1% of the time.
Data Table 4, Criminal Party versus Federal Government - The
slight liberal trend detected in this category by the 1997 Term data
has continued. Table 4 indicates that, during the 1998 Term, the
Court voted in favor of the Federal Government less often in all three
categories of decisions -"Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous." In
fact, the Court has only received a lower score in the "Majority"
category two times in the last ten Terms. The liberal trend in this
category is also evidenced in the individual Justices' records, with all
but two Justices voting less often in favor of the government. Despite
this liberal trend, a majority of the cases were still decided in favor of
the government.
Data Table 5, First Amendment; Data Table 6, Equal Protection -
The 1998 Term, like the 1997 Term, included very few cases falling
within the First Amendment and Equal Protection categories. The
Supreme Court addressed only two First Amendment claims and one
Equal Protection claim. Such limited data makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to detect ideological trends or positions in these two
43. Cases decided in favor of the states: Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998);
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 1001 (1999); Wyoming v.
Houghten, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). Cases decided against the states: City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); Lilly v. Virginia, 527
U.S. 116 (1999). In Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the Court addressed two issues
and decided for the state on one issue and against the state on the other.
categories, based on this data alone. However, a few results are
worth noting. The First Amendment, which we have described as
"faring poorly"" the last two Terms, did well this Term with all issues
being decided in favor of the First Amendment claim. Also
noteworthy in the First Amendment category is the voting record of
individual Justices, with historically conservative Justices Scalia and
Thomas voting liberally and typically liberal Justice Breyer voting
conservatively. In the Equal Protection category, the slightly liberal
trend indicated by the 1997 Term did not continue as the Court voted
unanimously against the claim in this Term's single Equal Protection
case. The claim addressed this Term was the first the Court has been
able to unanimously agree upon since 1991.
Data Table 7, Statutory Civil Rights - Following the liberal trend
of the past three Terms, the Majority once again increased its support
of statutory civil rights claims. Similarly, the percentage of split and
unanimous decisions in favor of civil rights claims also increased. The
ordering of the Justices was typical, ranging from Justice Stevens as
the most supportive to Justice Thomas as the least supportive of civil
rights claims.
Data Table 8, Jurisdiction - The Court accepted 55.0% of all
claims for the exercise of jurisdiction. This percentage closely hovers
around the Majority's average for the past decade with only a slight
change from last Term. Significant conservative movement can be
detected in the non-unanimous (or "Split") decision cases, which are
perhaps more ideologically charged cases. On the other hand, cases
decided unanimously showed a slight liberal movement. Individual
Justices also closely matched past performances with no Justices
evidencing a statistically significant change in voting behavior.
Data Table 9, Federalism - Despite this Term's widely publicized
"resurgence" of States' rights jurisprudence, this Study showed that
the Majority's average for decisions favoring the States is still a
predominantly liberal 36.0%, a figure only slightly more conservative
than last Term. Furthermore, State-supporting decisions in non-
unanimous (or "Split") cases barely increased and unanimous
decisions remained exactly the same. Overall, the Court's decisions
reflect only trivial conservative movement. On the other hand, voting
behavior of individual Justices reflected more radical change, with
one-third of the Court evidencing voting behavior that varied
significantly from past Terms. Furthermore, voting behavior this
44. See 1997 Study, supra note 1; see also 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 91, Table 5.
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Term suggests that, in the Federalism category, individual Justices
may be becoming more polarized in their ideological stances.
Data Table 10, Split Decisions - This Term almost matched last
Term's results with both conservative and liberal outcomes varying
less than one percent from the 1997 Term. Liberal outcomes were
reached 57.1% of the time and conservative outcomes resulted the
remaining 42.9% of the time. The gap between liberal and
conservative outcomes is predicted to increase next Term with a
forecasted 62.5% of the swing-vote cases being decided liberally.
Justice O'Connor occupied the position typically occupied by Justice
Kennedy, voting more often with the majority than any other Justice.
The Study also showed extremely accurate predictions for the voting
behavior of nearly one-half the Court. It remains to be seen whether
liberal outcomes in ideologically sensitive cases is a strengthening
trend.
IV. The 1998 Term Voting Record
This Study seeks to quantify several characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior by analyzing the Court's voting record. We
examine voting trends, patterns, and mean voting percentages both
for individual Justices and for the Court as a whole.45 Subpart A
below explains, in simple fashion, the numerical and statistical tests
used in this Study, and their representation in the charts and graphs
that follow.46 Subpart B provides a categorical analysis of significant
trends and patterns present in the data.
A. The Data
Data Tables 1 through 10 set out the Term-by-Term voting
scores for each Justice, the breakdown of votes contributing to 1998
Term scores, our predicted 1999 Term scores, the prediction error,
and our predicted scores for the 1998 Term. Scores are simply the
percentage of decisions in which a Justice voted in favor of the party
or claim indicated in each table's title. Predictions are based on an
ARIMA47 forecasting model. The bottom three rows of each Data
Table contain scores for the Court as a whole and are broken down
45. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or
precluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
46. For additional information regarding our methods of analysis, see infra Appendix
B.
47. ARIMA stands for AutoRegressive, Integrated Moving-Average. For more
information on this procedure, see infra Appendix B.
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into three categories. "Majority all Cases" summarizes the Court's
disposition of all decisions involving the indicated party or claim,
while "Split Decision" and "Unanimous" summarize only those
decisions reached by a divided' or unanimous Court respectively.
Charts 1 through 10 display, in graphical form, the Court's voting
record in each category over the course of the Study. The "Majority
All Cases" line reveals trends in the Court's disposition of cases
within the indicated category from one Term to the next. The "Split
Decisions" line is perhaps more interesting because it includes only
those cases in which Justices disagreed with one another and so may
provide a better indication of the Court's "balance" in each category.
The "Unanimous" line rounds out the information presented by
showing the outcome of cases in which there was no ideological
division.
Mean Tables 1 through 10 set out the mean of all scores recorded
for each Justice during the last ten Terms of this Study (1989-1998).
Also shown are the 99% confidence interval for the true mean, the
standard deviation of the scores, and the 1997 Term scores. The final
column indicates whether 1998 Term scores differ in a statistically
significant way from the Justice's past mean scores.
Finally, Regression Tables 1 through 10 show Pearson
correlations and adjusted r2 statistics relating the Justices' Term-to
Term voting patterns. The r2 statistic is a more reliable indicator of
correlation than the Pearson statistic. A high positive correlation
between Justices does not indicate that they vote together, but rather
that their Term-to-Term scores tend to move in similar directions. In
fact, this statistic may provide more information regarding the nature
of the cases decided each Term than it does regarding the Court's
voting behavior. Although some general indications of bloc voting
behavior might be deduced from this information, more reliable
information can be gleaned from our swing vote analysis49 and
frontier analysis.'0 For this reason, we devote only minimal discussion
to the correlation statistic this Term, but continue to include the data
in order to maintain consistency with information provided by the
Study in prior Terms.
48. A "divided Court" here means that at least one Justice did not agree with the
Majority. In other words, "Split Decision" cases are all those that are not unanimous.
49. See infra Data Table 10.
50. See infra Part VI and Appendix B.
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B. Analysis
Table 1: Civil-State Government versus Private Party
In the 1998 Term, the Court heard nearly twice as many civil
cases involving state parties as the previous Term."' Despite this
increase, Data Table 1 and Chart 1 show little change in the Court's
treatment of state governments in civil cases this Term. 2 For
example, the percentage of majority decisions in favor of a state party
decreased only 1.9 percentage points - from 46.7% in the 1997 Term
to 44.8% in the 1998 Term.5 3 However, non-unanimous (or "split"
decision) cases did experience a significant shift, increasing 13.8
percentage points from 33.3% to 47.1%.' This increase suggests a
stronger conservative sentiment towards state governments in the
1998 Term.
Individually, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas once
again tied as the most conservative Justices in this category, each
voting for the state party 65.5% of the time.55 This result was close to
each of their predicted scores, only 2.5 and 4.0 percentage points off
respectively. 6 The three-way tie of the 1997 Term was broken, as
Justice O'Connor slid into a tie with Justice Scalia for the next most
conservative Justice." They each voted for the state party in 55.2% of
51. This Term, the Court heard twenty-two civil cases involving a state party. In the
1997 Term, the Court heard approximately thirteen. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 584.
52. Cases decided in favor of state governments: American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Say. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Jefferson County v. Acker, 527
U.S. 423 (1999); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286
(1999); Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999);
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999); Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526
U.S. 32 (1999); City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999); Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999); and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). Cases
decided against state governments: Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); Martin
v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999); South Cent. Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found.,
525 U.S. 182 (1999); Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Cedar Rapids Community Sch. v.
Garret, 526 U.S. 66 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172
(1999); and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
53. See supra Data Table 1.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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the time. 8 The conservative to liberal ordering of the Justices in this
category remained basically the same as last Term. 9 However, both
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg indicated a statistically
significant change in voting behavior as both showed declining
support of state governments in the 1998 Term.co Justice Stevens'
score fell from 37.5% to 17.2%, while Justice Ginsburg's support fell
from 46.7% to 31.0%.61
Unlike statistical predictions for the last two voting Terms,
predicted voting patterns for the 1998 Term were too conservative.
Illustratively, of the predictions that were too liberal, none deviated
by more than 4 percentage points from the actual result. Conversely,
predictions that were too conservative were in error on average by
19.3 percentage points.62 Despite this, Justice Kennedy exhibited
quite predictable voting behavior as his score of 51.7% varied only 0.5
percentage points from his predicted score.
Once again, the strongest correlation in voting behavior was
between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg at 99%. 63 Additionally, the
adjusted r2 statistic for their correlation increased from 96% to 98%
between this Term and last.' Such a high correlation and adjusted r2
statistic indicate that the voting behavior of one of these two Justices
can be accurately predicted by the voting behavior of the other.
However, correlation does not imply causation. Interestingly, a 95%
correlation in voting behavior existed between Justice Breyer and
Chief Justice Rehnquist,' two rather ideologically opposed Justices.
Table 2: Civil-Federal Government versus Private Party
Data Table 2 and Chart 2 show that the Court's support of the
federal government in civil cases increased dramatically this Term,
with increased percentages in favor of the federal government in
"Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decision cases.' Specifically,
58. See id.
59. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 584.
60. See supra Mean Table 1.
61. See id.
62. See supra Data Table 1.
63. See supra Regression Table 1.
64. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 547.
65. See id.
66. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525
U.S. 366 (1999); California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449
['Vol. 27:423
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Majority decisions rose to 61.1% this Term, compared to the all-time
low of 36.4% last Term.67 Similarly, all nine Justices voted more often
for the federal government this Term.
Among individual Justices' voting records, perhaps the most
notable statistic is that, like last Term, historically liberal Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg were again among the most supportive of the
federal government. They tied for the second most conservative
voting spot, with a score of 68.4%.' Only Justice O'Connor, who
recorded a personal high score of 73.3%, was more consistent in her
support of the federal government in civil cases.69 On the contrary,
normally conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist was one of the least
supportive of the federal government, voting in its favor only 50% of
the time.70 Data Table 2 also shows a relatively narrow spread
between the most conservative and liberal voting Justices - separated
by only 23.3 percentage points.7' Such close scores coupled with the
unusual ordering of Justices suggests that civil cases involving federal
parties is not a reliable indicator of ideologically motivated voting
behavior. This is confirmed by the conclusion reached in the
Category Analysis section below72
Statistically predicted voting patterns were, with a few
exceptions, too liberal. For example, Justice Souter was predicted to
vote in favor of the government in only 42.2% of civil cases. Instead,
he recorded a rather conservative score of 66.7%.' Although Justice
Souter's increased support of the federal government did not
represent a statistically significant change in his voting behavior, the
change in voting behavior of four of the nine Justice's was statistically
(1999); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999);
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S.
255 (1999). Cases decided against the federal government: AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525
U.S. 366 (1999); California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local
1309 v. DOI, 526 U.S. 86 (1999); NASA v. Federal Labor Relation Auth., 527 U.S. 229
(1999); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Hanlon
v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
67. See supra Data Table 2.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See infra Part V. Category analysis attempts to identify those categories in this
study that truly reflect ideologically motivated voting behavior. The Civil-Federal Party
category is second to last-nearly the least indicative category in the study. See id.
73. See supra Data Table 2.
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significant.74 None of the Justices voted in a manner that produced
notable correlations.
Table 3: Criminal-State Government versus a Private Party
Data Table 3 and Chart 3 demonstrate the Court's decreased
favor for the states in criminal cases during the 1998 Term.75 While
the majority of the Court voted for the state 71.4% of the time in the
1997 Term, the majority voted for the state only 63.6% of the time
during the 1998 Term. 6 Although this decrease may indicate a slight
liberal trend, it might also be explained by the notable conservative
increase during the 1997 Term resulting in the second highest
conservative score since 1989. The 1998 decrease may only indicate
that the 1997 Term was unusually conservative and not necessarily an
accurate indicator of the Court's liberal/conservative nature.'
However, a slight liberal trend is also evidenced by the decreased
individual scores of each Justice. Specifically, Justices Kennedy and
Souter had the most dramatic decreases, each voting for the
government over 20% less than they did in 1997.78 Justice Thomas
remained at the top, voting for the government in 80% of the
decisions, and Justice Stevens reclaimed the most liberal position,
with a score of 9.1%." Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to vote
predictably with his score varying only 0.3 percentage points from last
Term's prediction.
Although the Court - both overall and as individual Justices -
voted less often in favor of state parties in criminal cases this Term, a
slight conservative trend is evidenced by the increased score in non-
unanimous (or "split") decisions for state parties of 77.8%.' On the
other hand, the "Unanimous" cases reflected the liberal trend shown
in the other categories, with the Court voting against the states in
74. See supra Mean Table 2.
75. Cases decided in favor of the states: Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1999);
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 1001 (1999); Wyoming v.
Houghten, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). Cases decided against the states: City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); Lilly v. Virginia, 527
U.S. 116 (1999). In Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the Court addressed two issues
and decided for the state on one issue and against the state on the other.
76. See supra Data Table 3.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
100% of the unanimous decisions-the most liberal score since the
1990 Term.8
Table 4: Criminal-Federal Government versus Private Party
The Court's support for the federal government in criminal cases
notably decreased in the 1998 Term.' Although scores remain
moderately conservative, Data Table 4 and Chart 4 indicate that, for
the first time since prior to 1989, the Court's scores decreased in all
three types of decisions - "Majority", "Split," and "Unanimous." The
Majority of the Court held for the federal government 61.5% of the
time, and of the cases decided unanimously, 75.0% were decided in
favor of the government.' The Court has only recorded a lower score
in the "Majority" category twice in the last ten Terms; and, although
75.0% in the "Unanimous" category remains a high score, it is a
marked decrease from the 100% scores received in the last two
consecutive Terms." In non-unanimous (or "split" decision) cases,
the Court decided for the federal government in only five of the nine
cases.' The slightly liberal trend detected in the declining "Majority"
and "Split" scores of last Term seems to have continued and possibly
gained momentum during the 1998 Term.
The Court's liberal trend is further illuminated in the Justices'
individual voting scores. All but Justice O'Connor and Justice
Rehnquist voted less often for the federal government than last Term,
and all Justices received lower scores than they have received in at
least the previous two Terms.' Chief Justice Rehnquist again voted
as predicted, varying only 1.3% from our last predictions.' Justice
Ginsburg received her lowest score yet. However, Justice Stevens
maintained his position as the most liberal Justice, voting for the
81. See id.
82. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S.
529 (1999); Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); Holloway
v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999); Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999); United
States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999). Cases decided against the government:
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999);
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999); United States v. Sun Diamond Growers,
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
83. See supra Data Table 4.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
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federal government in only 38.5% of the decisions."
The conservative to liberal ordering of the Justices is particularly
interesting in Data Table 4. While Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
the two most frequent swing voters, occupy the top two positions,
both Justices Scalia and Thomas, typically among the most
conservative, occupy unusually low positions. This peculiar ordering
may be explained by a number of decisions where Justice Scalia's and
Justice Thomas's narrow reading of the law led them to liberal
outcomes.89
Table 5: First Amendment
The Court decided only two cases which touched on First
Amendment issues this Term.9° This limited data makes it difficult to
detect ideological trends or positions in this category. However, one
point is clear: the conclusion reached in the 1996 and 1997 Studies,9'
that the "First Amendment fared poorly,"' did not hold true in the
1998 Term. Although the Court adjudicated only two cases involving
First Amendment claims, the Court actually reached decisions on
four different First Amendment issues.93 Each issue was decided in
favor of the claim, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor and Breyer dissenting on two of the four issues addressed. 4
So, rather than "far[ing] poorly," the First Amendment fared very
well during the 1998 Term.
There are a few results worth noting among the individual
Justices' voting reports. Justices Thomas and Scalia - typically
conservative voters in this category - voted for the claim and,
88. See id.
89. See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227 (1999); and United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999).
90. The two cases decided were Buckley v. America Constitutional Law Found., 525
U.S. 182 (1999) and Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999).
91. See 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 90; 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 540.
92. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 588
93. In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the Court
addressed three First Amendment issues: 1) Did the company requirement that petition
circulators be registered voters violate the First Amendment?; 2) Did the company
requirement that petition circulators wear badges stating their name and indicating
whether they were paid or volunteer violate the First Amendment?; 3) Did the company
requirement that the names and addresses of all paid petition circulators be turned into
the company violate the First Amendment?
94. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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therefore, liberally on all four First Amendment issues, while Justice
Breyer - typically a liberal voter in this category - joined Justice
O'Connor's conservative dissent against the claim on two of the four
issues.
Finally, the study's 1998 prediction for the Majority votes in
favor of the First Amendment claim was 90.1 percentage points in
error, the largest error percentage of all nine categories.95 This large
error is a result of the lack of First Amendment cases decided during
both the 1997 and 1998 Term.
Table 6: Equal Protection
This Term, the Court decided only one case touching on an equal
protection issue.96 Like the First Amendment category, such limited
data creates statistical problems and this Term's voting record might
best be analyzed in conjunction with the 1997 Term's decisions.
The equal protection record for the 1997 Term indicated a slight
liberal movement. However, this detection was based upon the only
two equal protection cases addressed by the Court. In the 1998 Term,
the Court's single Equal Protection decision was unanimously
decided against the claim and, therefore, decided conservatively.
Among the ten categories of cases, the Equal Protection category was
joined only by the "Civil-Federal Party" category in moving to the
conservative half of the spectrum.'
Combining this Term's decision with those made in the 1997
Term may provide a better indicator of ideological trends in this
category. If the single issue decided during this Term had been
decided during the 1997 Term, this single conservative decision would
have offset the liberal trend detected in last Term's voting record.
Therefore, combining the records for the 1997 and 1998 Terms
indicates that, with respect to Equal Protection issues, the Court is
maintaining its generally conservative disposition.
Data Table 6 and Chart 6 provide at least one notable statistic:
the issue presented this Term was the first the Court has been able to
unanimously agree upon since 1991.9' The data also indicate that last
95. See supra Data Table 5.
96. The only case decided was Central State University v. American Ass'n of Univ.
Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999).
97. Compare supra Data Table 4 and Data Table 6 with supra Data Tables 1-3,5, and
7-10.
98. See supra Data Table 6. Note, however, that Justice Stevens did not take a
position on the equal protection issue in Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ.
Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999). Thus, the Court was "unanimous" among the eight
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Term's prediction for this Term's Majority votes in favor of the Equal
Protection claim was 62.5 percentage points in error." As with the
First Amendment prediction, this large error is a result of the lack of
Equal Protection cases decided during both the 1997 and 1998 Terms.
Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights
Following the liberal-trend in this category, the Court increased
its support of statutory civil rights claims for the fourth consecutive
Term.'O Data Table 7 and Chart 7 indicate that the majority voted in
favor of statutory civil rights claims 64.7% of the time."' This liberal
trend is further manifested in the percentage of non-unanimous (or
"split" decision) and unanimous cases decided in favor of such claims,
which increased to 63.6% and 66.7%, respectively."
The liberal to conservative ordering of the Justices in this
category was representative of typical ideologies. Justice Stevens
recorded the most liberal score of 88.2%, his second highest in this
category since the inception of this study."O Justice Breyer followed
by supporting claims for statutory civil rights 82.4% of the time." On
the other end of the liberal/conservative spectrum, Justice Thomas
only supported statutory civil rights claims 23.5% of the time. 5 The
significant spread between the high and low scores illuminates the
ideological divide among the Justices in this category.
The predicted voting behavior for this Term was generally too
Justices reaching the issue.
99. See id.
100. Cases decided in favor of statutory civil rights claims: Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Lopez v. Monterrey County, 525 U.S. 266 (2000); Roberts v.
Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999); Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998); Wright v.
Universal Maritime Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999);
NASA v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 527 U.S. 229 (1999); West v. Gibson, 527
U.S. 212 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1990); Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); and Cedar Rapids Community Sch. v.
Garret, 526 U.S. 66 (1999). Cases decided against the statutory civil rights claim:
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); and
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
101. See supra Data Table 7.
102. See icL
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See infra Part V (indicating that the Statutory Civil Right's category is the second
most indicative category for ideologically motivated decisions).
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liberal. For example, the predictions for Justices Ginsburg, Souter,
and Kennedy were each too liberal by more than twenty percentage
points." However, the predicted majority outcome was far too
conservative - only 43.9% when the actual score was 64.7%. ' °8 A
notable correlation between Justice Souter and Ginsburg can be
detected as the two recorded a 94% correlation with an adjusted r2
statistic of 85%." Although this does not indicate that Justices
Souter and Ginsburg vote alike on issues,"n it does reflect that their
conservative/liberal movements in this category usually proceed in
the same direction.
Table & Jurisdiction
Data Table 8 lists the Justices from the most liberal to the most
conservative voting in the Jurisdiction category."' This Term, the
Majority decided 55.0% of all claims for the exercise of jurisdiction in
favor of the claim."' This closely matches the Majority's average for
the past decade, and only drops 3.6 percentage points from the 1997
Term's average." In fact, since 1995, the. Majority's average has
deviated less than seven percentage points."' Despite this minimal
107. See supra Data Table 7.
108. See id
109. See supra Regression Table 7.
110. See infra Appendix B.
111. See supra Data Table 8. Votes in favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction are
considered liberal, while votes denying jurisdiction are considered conservative. Chart 8 is
similarly organized; the higher the line, the more liberal the voting behavior. See supra
Chart 8.
112. The following are cases decided in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction:
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(1999); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999); Grupo Mexicana de
Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Jefferson County, v. Acker, 527
U.S. 423 (1999); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, 526 U.S. 344 (1999); Ruhgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999); South
Cent. Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); United States v. Rodriquez-Moreno, 526 U.S.
275 (1999); and Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). Cases
decided against the exercise of jurisdiction are: Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999);
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999); El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui
Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473
(1999); Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); Grupo
Mexicana de Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Marquez v. Screen
Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (1998); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); and Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs. v. Shalala, 525 U.S.
449 (1999).
113. See supra Data Table 8.
114. See id.
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deviation, Data Table 8 shows the prediction for this Term was 62.6%
in favor of jurisdiction claims, which is still 7.6 percentage points
higher than the actual result.115 The prediction for next Term
accounts for this and places the Majority's average at a low, but still
liberal, 52.8%.116
Non-unanimous (or "Split") decision cases decided in favor of
the exercise of jurisdiction dropped 30.4 percentage points, indicating
a significant conservative movement in ideologically charged cases.
On the other hand, a slight liberal movement can be detected in
unanimous cases decided in favor of jurisdiction, which increased 18.6
percentage points from the 1997 Term.
18
Like the Majority's averages, voting averages for individual
Justices also closely matched past performances. Mean Table 8
indicates that not a single Justice showed statistically significant
changes in voting behavior."9 In fact, every Justice save Justice
Breyer was within five percentage points of his/her predicted average,
and Justice Scalia voted within one-tenth of his predicted average.2"
The Jurisdiction category is the only category this Term where at
least one Justice's voting behavior did not deviate statistically
significantly from the past. Furthermore, in this category, typical
ideological positions tend to be revealed. For example, Justices
Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter voted 60.0% or more in favor
of jurisdiction claims, while Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia
voted 45.0% or less for jurisdiction claims.' Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy voted right in the middle at 55.0%.12
Table 9: Federalism
Data Table 9 lists the Justices from most conservative to most
liberal."l Counter to this Term's touted resurgence for State's rights,
Data Table 9 shows that the Majority's average for decisions favoring
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See supra Mean Table 8.
120. See supra Data Table 8.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See supra Data table 9. Chart 9 is similarly organized; the higher the line, the
more conservative the voting behavior. See supra Chart 9.
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the States is still a predominantly liberal 36.0%.14 This is only a 4.4%
increase from the 1997 Term.'2 Non-unanimous (or "Split")
decisions increased only 2.3% to 46.7% in favor of the States, and
unanimous decisions remained exactly the same at 20.0%."2
Furthermore, Data Table 9 shows that this Term's majority result was
29.1 percentage points lower - or more liberal - than the prediction.127
This demonstrates that, overall, the Court's decisions reflect only an
ever-so-slight conservative movement.
On the other hand, the individual Justices' voting behavior
exhibited significant changes. For example, Mean Table 9 shows that
the voting of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Ginsburg varied
significantly from past Terms." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
voting 8.0% and 28.0% respectively, voted in favor of the State at
their all-time lows.' 29 Further, although Justice Kennedy's average
was only 2.1% more liberal than his 1997 Term's average,3 ' his 40.0%
average in favor of the State was still low enough to tag his voting
behavior as a statistically significant deviation from the combined
mean of past Terms.' In contrast, Justice Thomas voted 27.2%
higher in favor of the States compared with last Term with an average
of 64.0%, and both Justices Rehnquist and Scalia increased their
averages more than 20%.132
Despite Justice Thomas' substantial increase in favor of the
124. Cases decided in favor of the State are: Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999); City of W.
Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999); College Say. v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. v. College Say., 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); Stewart v. LeGrand, 526 U.S. 1001
(1999); UNUM Life Ins. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999). Cases decided in favor of the United States are: AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S.
473 (1999); Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344
(1999); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); South Cent. Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160
(1999); and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
125. See supra Data Table 9.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See supra Mean Table 9.
129. See supra Data Table 9.
130. See id.
131. See supra Mean Table 9.
132- See supra Data Table 9.
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States, his actual voting average deviated less than 1 point from the
prediction." Justice Kennedy's average this Term was also close to
the prediction, varying only 2.3 points. 4 Predictions for other
Justices were not so accurate. Justice O'Connor voted 42.4 points
more liberally than predicted, and both Justices Breyer and Souter
voted about 35 points more in favor of the United States."5 For
Justices Breyer and Souter, this voting pattern drastically alters their
predicted voting averages for next Term, which are 8.5% and 8.0%
respectively in favor of the States.'36 In sum, although the Court
Majority's averages stayed relatively stable in the Federalism
category, this Term's voting behavior suggests that the individual
Justices are becoming more polarized in their ideological stances.
Table 10: Swing Votes
Data Table 10 and Chart 10 indicate the voting scores for the
seventeen cases this Term that were decided by a margin of one
vote.' From both conservative and liberal outcomes last Term, this
Term's decisions have deviated less than one point.'38 Conservative
decisions were reached 42.9% of the time, and liberal decisions were
reached for the remaining 57.1 %.139 This is the second consecutive
time that the liberal coalition has prevailed over the conservative, and
the fourth time over the course of this study. Whether this is a
strengthening trend remains to be seen. However, next year's
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome are: Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. v. College Say., 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Grupo Mexicana de Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Jones v.
United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526
(1999); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); and West v.
Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999). Swing-vote cases reaching a liberal outcome are: California
Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423
(1999); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999); NASA v.
National Federal Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229 (1999); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, Local 1309 v. DOI, 526 U.S. 86 (1999); and West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212
(1999).
138. See supra Data Table 10.
139. See id.
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prediction widens the gap between the conservative and liberal
decision, forecasting that 62.5% of the swing-vote cases will be
decided liberally.'"
Justices in Data Table 10 are organized from those agreeing most
often with the majority in swing-vote cases to those agreeing least
with the majority.' Justice O'Connor, for the first time since 1990,
occupied the most influential swing-voter position, knocking Justice
Kennedy from his four-year reign.'42 Justice O'Connor voted 75.0%
of the time - a personal record'43 - with the majority.'" Justice
Kennedy is predicted to retake this position next year, voting 80.4%
of the time with the majority.'45 Predictions this Term for Justices
Breyer, Thomas, Rehnquist, and Souter were extremely accurate, all
coming within five percentage points of the Justices' actual voting
record.
Justice Stevens, who - along with Justice Souter - agreed the
least with the Majority last Term, moved to the number three spot
this Term, voting 60.71% of the time for the Majority - another
personal record.'46 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer reflected
neutral positions, voting 50.0% for the majority in both conservative
and liberal outcomes.
V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some
categories turn out to be better indicators than others of the Court's
collective and individual predilections.
Some categories, although tending to divide the Court into
liberal/conservative blocs, may change polarity depending on the
specific issues presented. For example, during the 1996 Term, First
Amendment scores placed Justices Scalia and Thomas at the top - a
liberal position under this Study's definitions, and a position not
commonly occupied by these particular Justices. Conversely, Justice
Breyer held the bottom spot last Term. Other categories tend to be
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. A personal record during the course of this study.
144. See supra Data Table 10.
145. See id.
146. A personal record during the course of this study.
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implicated in very few cases. The small sample results in highly
volatile score movements from Term to Term because a single case
may account for many percentage points. This point is dramatically
illustrated this Term in both the First Amendment and Equal
Protection categories, with only three cases touching on these issues
between both categories.147 Because only one Equal Protection issue
was decided and was decided unanimously (save for Justice Stevens
who didn't reach the issue)"4 each Justice scored 0% in the category' 49
- an unprecedented result.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between more liberal and more conservative Justices, we have
applied factor analysis.5 ' By applying this method, we have
determined that a primary factor may be extracted from the Study's
categories that accounts for over 37% of the variance revealed by the
data on Tables 1 through 9."' We interpret this factor as
liberal/conservative bias because that is what this Study purports to
measure. The categories currently load onto this primary factor as
follows:
Category Factor 1
Criminal/State Party 0.864
Statutory Civil Rights 0.782
Civil/State Party 0.744
Jurisdiction 0.727
Criminal/Federal Party 0.673
Federalism 0.589
First Amendment 0.302
Civil/Federal Party 0.098
Equal Protection 0.009
Variance 3.341
% Variance 0.371
According to this ranking, the "Criminal: State versus Private
Party" category appears to be our best differentiator of
liberal/conservative leanings, while Equal Protection is our poorest.
A look at the data seems to confirm this result.
147. See supra Data Tables 5 and 6.
148. See Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124
(1999).
149. See supra Data Table 6.
150. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
151. We employed a QMAX rotation to achieve this result.
Equal Protection claims are relatively rare and produce volatile
results.15 Civil-Federal Party case scores, moreover, tend to switch
poles as executive administrations change. Liberal administrations
will bring different types of cases before the Court than will
conservative administrations and will garner the support of different
Justices. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's average score was
74% under Republican administrations, but has fallen to 54% since
President Clinton took office.'53 On the other hand, Justice Stevens
averaged 48% under the Republicans and 61% under President
Clinton." First Amendment cases also tend toward pole swapping.
For example, if the 1996 Term's free speech issues had concerned flag
burning rather than abortion clinic demonstrations and government
regulation, the scores might have been nearly reversed. 55
Category analysis, in short, suggests that the most reliable
indicator of actual ideology is the data collected on Table 3
(criminal/state party), with Tables 7 (statutory civil rights), 1 (state
civil actions), 8 (jurisdiction), and 4 (federal criminal cases) providing
the next most reliable data. Tables 9 (federalism), 5 (First
Amendment), 2 (federal civil actions) and 6 (Equal Protection)
provide the least reliable information.
VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their
validity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's
selection of which questions it will decide. With varying parameters
such as these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.56
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
152. See supra Chart 6.
153. See supra Data Table 2.
154. See id; see also discussion of Table 2, supra.
155. See 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 91. Note, however, that because of the First
Amendment category's small sampling for the last two years, (only three cases for the
1997 Term and 1998 Term combined) it has not been as indicative of ideological positions
as it has in the past.
156. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see Appendix B.
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than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by
the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the
established frontier. Moreover, by adjusting the relative weights
allocated to each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each
category's effectiveness as determined by factor analysis.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4. Two versions of each frontier are
presented. In Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights applied to
each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described
above.157 In other words, each Justice is allowed to "choose" the
weights that produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject
to the limitation that Statutory Civil Rights cannot receive more
weight than Criminal/State, Civil/State cannot receive more weight
than Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth. Tables 3 and 4 apply no
weighting constraints at all, allowing each Justice to "choose" those
weights that present him or her in the most conservative or liberal
light possible. Each table lists a "Percent of Frontier" score for each
Justice. Those with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing
the category weight distribution shown in the category columns.
Scores less than 100% indicate that the most conservative/liberal
score the Justice could obtain with optimal weighting places him or
her the indicated percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some
cases, an optimal combination of weights may even place a Justice
beyond the frontier. This condition is known as "superefficiency"
and is noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of each
Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices replacing
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to frontier determination during
Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier
scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's relative
positions and score ranges overall. They do not, however, show any
trend information.
The Charts reveal several interesting trends. Frontier Chart 1
shows Justice Thomas making a superefficient conservative "splash"
157. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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during his first Term on the Court, then settling in around the frontier
thereafter. Frontier Chart 2 shows clear and growing domination of
the liberal frontier by Justice Stevens. "58
Frontier Chart 3 shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas have all reached the
conservative frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the
Chief Justice has demonstrated conservative superefficiency in each
Term other than 1997. Frontier Chart 4 clearly displays Justice
Stevens' superefficient liberal tendencies. In fact, Stevens so
dominates the liberal frontier that only two other Justices, Breyer and
Souter, have managed to touch the frontier. Justice Ginsburg is alone
in reaching neither the liberal nor the conservative frontiers during
her five Terms on the Court.
158. See infra Frontier Analysis, Table 2. This superefficiency is due in large part to
Justice Souter's lone vote in favor of the only First Amendment issue decided by the
Court this Term.
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VII. Conclusion
The 1998 Term exhibits a strengthening trend in the Court's
recent disposition to vote liberally on ideologically divided issues.
Supporting this conclusion is the detected liberal movement in six of
the ten categories, with three of the remaining four categories
showing trivial conservative movement. Also, despite this Term's
touted resurgence favoring States' rights, this Term shows that the
Court still votes a strong 64.0% in favor of the federal government on
federalism issues - a patently liberal result that contrasts with the
results reached in the majority of this decade's Terms. Also
strengthening is the Court's three-year trend favoring statutory civil
rights claims with this Term's decade-high 64.7%. Finally, in swing-
vote cases, which is perhaps the most reliable indicator of the Court's
posture, the Court predominately favored liberal outcomes, with
Justice O'Connor playing the key role. This is the second consecutive
Term that the Rehnquist Court has voted predominately liberally on
close cases decided by one vote, and the third time such a result has
been reached in the past five Terms. This suggests that ideologically
charged cases are yielding more and more liberal results. Combining
these liberal indicators with the relatively minor conservative
movements indicates that the Court may be more liberal than present
commentary suggests. Indeed, for this professed "conservative"
Court, a shift towards a liberal balance-of-power seems well in place
and poised to expand in Terms to come.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1998 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been
excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by
summary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a
full opinion of the Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent.
Cases decided by a four-four vote resulting in affirmance without
written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per
curiam opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons
in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of
these categories are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a
problem of classification. No cases in 1998 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials, or, with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included if that official is represented by government
attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly
implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if
governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If
both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the
same side with only private parties on the other, the case is included
on Data Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than once on the
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the
outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting
alignments.
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4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination
on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or
physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
included if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute,
or if the issue involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case
at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution
and the issue relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this
exclusion is to preserve the distinction between constitutional and
non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness,
abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and
state or local governments. Common examples of these issues are
preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action,
and federal court interference with state court activities (other than
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review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or
interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are
excluded from the table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-
three decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions
that reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-
three or four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from
the majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance
by a tie vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it
raises two or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case
and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. We analyze these
characteristics both for the Court as a whole and for individual
Justices.159 The following sections explain the statistical methods
employed in this Study and how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments.
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.'6° This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA modeling is most easily
explained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This refers to a differencing process which operates in
a manner similar to differentiation of a continuous function in
calculus. The goal is simply to remove trend from the time series data
by subtracting each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time series. This
operation may be repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs only one differencing
operation.
Auto-Regression: Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be determined. 6' This parameter
159. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or
precluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
160. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
161. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data series produces the most accurate forecasts
with single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
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seeks to relate each data point in the stationary series to the data
point immediately preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X, = AXf,
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is the
autoregressive parameter, and X,.1 is the value of the data series point
immediately preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points, however, a
single parameter will almost never precisely produce the relationship
just described for all data point pairs. Some error is inevitable. We
therefore seek to determine that parameter which produces the least
total error when applied to the entire series.162
Moving Average: A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X, to the error between the estimated
value and the actual value of the previous element X,1. 163 That is:X, = -Bx,.,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The value of this
parameter is also optimized to minimize its total error when applied
to the series.
Synthesis:The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Axt-Bx,.1+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining between the
calculated and actual values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the score for the following Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"' 64 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.165 We hypothesize that X, is also
162. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
163. Although this operation may not seem as intuitive as the autoregression
operation, it may help to think of the error terms as "'shocks' that initially set the process
in motion and continue to keep it in motion thereafter." JOHN C. HOFF, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO BOX-JENKINS FORECASTING 51 (1983).
164. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also
CRAIG & HOGG, supra note 42.
165. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
the true mean of the population g, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
Ho: 1i = X The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not significantly
shift p from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the
two samples are statistically equivalent.
H,: g- X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly shifts g
from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a
certain confidence interval," by rejecting the null hypothesis.67 This
is accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
t-s / f-n
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (9)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).'6 If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, Ho is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an
upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the
voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens show only
a very weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely
scattered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant
correlations between and among Justices' Term-to-Term voting
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
166. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X, may shift p in either a positive or negative direction = .025.
167. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 164.
168. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
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patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in
each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number
is an R2 statistic.'69 Notice that Justices, such as Justice Breyer, for
whom we have few data points, are especially likely to show high
Pearson coefficients, but low R2 statistics. The latter is a more
reliable measure of the actual level of correlation.
Equal Protection Cases
0 10 20
y = 0.717x + 7.4944
R2 = 0.7921
30 40 50 60 70
Rehnquist
Figure I
Equal Protection Cases
y =-0.1542x + 35.473
F t=0.0473
80
60 •
ca 40 --
U) 20
0 20 40 60 80 100
Stevens
Figure 2
The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two
Justices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It
simply means that their scores tend to move up and down together
169. The r2 statistic is an estimate of .2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the
tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
(0
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from one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way
implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using
batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software from Minitab, Inc. The factor loadings presented
were obtained by applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full
description of the theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis
is beyond the scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject
provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process."
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of
"world's greatest athlete." Their scores in two events are listed in the
following table:
Croquet Marbles
Alan 9 2
Betty 7 7
Chuck 4 5
Debbie 3 8
Alan's agent would argue that the title should go to the best
croquet player, while Debbie's agent would argue that the best
marbles player should win. Betty's agent would argue that each sport
should receive equal weight. To see why, weight each of the scores
above by 50% and add each athlete's resulting scores together. Alan
would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5. Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7
x 0.5) = 7. Chuck's score would be 4.5, and Debbie's score would be
5.5. The situation is presented graphically in the following figure:
170. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed.
1990).
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Athletic Frontier
10 A
Key
CoC
5- .A = AlanDB = Betty
C = Chuck
D = Debbie
0 5 10
SCroquet
A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond
which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights
assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of
the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to the
extent it lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent
to it on the frontier A and D are also super-efficient to the extent
they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at
which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the frontier
regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet. However,
an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C "looks his
best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this
appendix.'
171. For more information on frontier analysis, see generally DONALD L.
ADOLPHSON, MANAGER'S TOOLKIT: MANAGERIAL SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS (1998).
